Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1971

Betty J. Wickes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company, An Illinois Corporation : Brief
of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
David K. Winder; Counsel for Defendant-RespondentAllan Larson; Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Wickes v. State Farm, No. 12598 (Utah Supreme Court, 1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3168

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

/ IN THE SUPREME CO
,f10F THE STATE ,op·:-:r·'·~,
~'

ALLAN L. LAB.SON of

WORSLEY, SNOW &: CHJUS1rile
..~,
Counsel for Pltlitdiff-AH"""1d ·· ., ·.
7th Floor Continental Bank Buildiaa
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

·

; .

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
NATURE OF THE CASE ------------------------------------------------------------

l

DISPOSITION IN WWER COURT --------------------·-····--------·---

l

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ------·-···-----·--·--·-----------------------

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------···-······--·······--------- 2
ARGUMENT -------------------------------------------------------------------------------POINT I.
"S COVERAGE" IS VEHICLE INSURANCE, NOT
LIFE INSURANCE, AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
STATUTORY 30-DAY GRACE PERIOD REQUIREMENT FOR LIFE INSURANCE ----------------------------------------

8

8

POINT IL
LOSSES WHICH OCCURRED WITHIN TEN DAYS
AFTER THE EXPIRATION DATE ARE NOT COVERED UNLESS THE PREMIUM WAS RECEIVED
WITHIN THAT TIME ------------------------------------------------------ 12
POINT III.
NO W AIYER OF TIMELY PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM OCCURRED BY ACCEPTANCE OF IT AFTER
NOTICE OF THE LOSS SINCE NO PART OF THE
PREMIUM PAID WAS EVER APPLIED TO THE
PERIOD OF THE LOSS AND IT WAS ONLY APPLIED FOR FUTURE COVERAGE FROM THE DATE
RECEIVED -----------------------------------------------·--------------······-------· 22
CONCLUSION -----------------------------------------------·-·--··-···-------··----------- 40
CASES CITED
American National Insurance Company v. Cooper,
458 P.2d 257 (Colo. 1969) ---·--···-·---------------···-···-··-----···--------38
Barnett v. State Automobile and Casualty Underwriters,
487 P.2d 311 (Utah 1971) ------------------------·--··-----···--···--------·· 31
Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama v. Colquitt,
168 So. 2d 251 ------------------------------··--··-·-·····-·····--··-·----------------19

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Page
Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters, Inc.,
275 P.2d 675, 2 Utah 2d 373 (Utah 1954) ________________________ 38
Ellerbeck v. Continental Casualty Company,
227 P. 805 (Utah 1924) -------------------------------------------------------- 35
Farrington v. Granite State Fire Insurance Company,
232 P.2d 754 (Utah 1951) ---------------------------------------------------- 37
Loftis v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company
of California, 114 P. 134 (Utah 1911) -------------------------------- 32
McClure v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, 148 S.E. 2d 475 (Georgia 1966) ------------------------ 15
Meadows v. Continental Assurance Company,
89 F.2d 256 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20
Moore v. Prudential Insurance Company,
No. 12388 (Utah 1971) ---------------------------------------------------------- 37
Parker v. California State Life Insurance Company,
40 P.2d 175 (Utah 1935) ------------------------------------------------------ 36
Pickens v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, 144 S.E. 2d 68 (So. Carolina 1965) -------------------· 20
Sahlin v. American Casualty Company of Reading, Penn.,
103 Ariz. 57, 436 P.2d 606 (1968) ---------------------------------------- 17
Seavey v. Erickson,
69 N.W. 2d 889, 244 Minnesota 232,
52 A.L.R. 2d 1144 (1955). ---------------------------------------------------- 33
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v.
Robison, 461 P.2d 520 (Ariz. 1970) -----------------------------------· 15
Sullivan v. Beneficial Life Insurance Company,
64 P.2d 351 (Utah 1937) ------------------------------------------------------·· 34
Tucker v. New York Life Insurance Company,
18
155 P.2d 173 -------------------------------------------------------------------------·

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
STATUTES OTED
Section 31-11-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ------------------------ 9, 40
Section 31-22-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ------------------------ 10, 11
Section 31-22-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 --------------------------

11

Section 31-22-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 --------------------------

11

Section 31-22-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ----------------------------

11

Section 31-22-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ----------------------------

11

Section 31-29-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ----------------------------

11

Section 31-11-6 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ----------------------

12

Section 31-19-18, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ------------------------

31

Section 31-19-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ------------------------

31

Section 31-19-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ------------------------

31

TREATISES CITED
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice,
Section 7960 and 7961 ----------------------------------------------------------

19

Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth Edition) --------------------------------

18

Long, The Law of Liability Insurance, Section 17-42 --------------

33

Prosser, The Making of a Contract of Insurance in
Minnesota, 17 Minn. L.Rev. 567, 594 ----------------------------------

23

Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Section 24 --------------------

15

43 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 1129 --------------------------------------------------------

33

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BETTY J. WICKES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY, an Illinois
corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
12598

BRIEF O,F RESPONDENT
STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover $10,000 as the "death
benefit" claimed to be owing to the plaintiff as beneficiary
under an automobile insurance policy issued by the defendant to the plaintiff and her deceased husband, Homer
W. Wickes.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Both parties moved for Summary Judgment in the
lower court based upon all the pleadings and all other
documents in the file, including Interrogatories, Request
for Admissions and Answers thereto, Affidavits and dep1

ositions. The District Court, by the Honorable D. Frank
\\lilkins, granted the defendant's Motion for Summa
Judgment of dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and deni~
the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant and respondent seeks affirmance of
the Judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the most part, defendant agrees with the state·
ment of facts as set forth in plaintiff's brief. However,
there are some additional facts that should be set forth
and some clarification made of certain other claimed facts.
Defendant submits that this is an uncomplicated case
both factually and legally although it is conceded that it
is an unfortunate case from the plaintiff's standpoint in
that there unquestionably was $10,000 that the plaintiff
could have realized upon as a death benefit under an auto·
mobile policy issued by the defendant had a premium been
paid eight days earlier than it was paid. This is all the
more unfortunate because the uncontradicted evidence is
that State Farm's Sales Agent James G. Starbuck had a
telephone conversation with plaintiff's son, James R.
Wickes, who was then acting for the plaintiff, and urged
that the premium be paid at a time when there was still
six days left in which it could be paid and the $10,000
collected (Affidavit of James G. Starbuck, para. 6).
Nevertheless, the premium was not paid at that time. For
reasons that had nothing to do with defendant, State Farm,
2

the check for the premium payment was not put in the
mail to State Farm until 16 days after the expiration date
of the policy and not received by State Farm until two
days later or 18 days after the expiration date of the policy.
Plaintiff's failure to pay the premium in time was unfortunate. Certain of her other problems disclosed in her
brief were tragic. Not only did she lose her husband in
this automobile accident of August 2, 1969, but as pointed
out by her attorney in her brief and "while not appearing
in the record," her son James R. Wickes was killed in a
plane crash subsequent to his deposition being taken in
this case. On the somewhat more positive side to these
tragedies, although also "not appearing in the record,"
is the fact that Mrs. Wickes' husband's death resulted from
an accident involving another State Farm insured with
high liability coverage and the claim for Mr. Wickes'
death was settled by State Farm's payment to his heirs, including Mrs. Wickes, of $60,000.
There is no question in this case but that the State
Farm policy in question expired, according to its terms, at
midnight on August 1, 1969, and prior to Homer W.
Wickes' accident or death. (Copy of policy is attached to
Request for Admissions and genuineness thereof is admitted in Answers to Request for Admissions.) It is also
conceded that no premium was paid or tendered to State
Farm following the expiration date of the policy and until
August 16, 1969 when plaintiff's $48 check was mailed to
Agent Starbuck by plaintiff's son from Phoenix, Arizona
and was received by Starbuck on August 18, 1969 (Affidavit of Starbuck, para. 8 and Exhibit "A" attached thereto).
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The return address of the envelope in which this
check was sent indicated the insured's new address was
"Betty Wickes, 6547 North, 44th Ave., Glendale, Ariz.
85301." In the letter accompanying the check, James
Wickes advised that the $48 was for payment of the insurance on the 1962 Olds, this being the vehicle Mrs.
Wickes had taken to Arizona. He further advised Mr.
Starbuck that the policy should be issued only in Mrs.
Wickes' name and his father's name should be deleted
from the policy (Affidavit of Starbuck and Exhibit "A"
attached thereto).
Both Mrs. Betty Wickes and James Wickes testified
that they were very concerned following Mr. Wickes'
death and at the time the $48 premium was mailed by
James Wickes on August 16, 1969 that there be coverage
with State Farm on the 1962 Oldsmobile for the future
(Betty Wickes' deposition, pages 7, 14, 15, 16 and 22 and
James R. Wickes' deposition, page 27). Defendant sub·
mits that this concern is of considerable importance in this
case and their testimony relating to it will be referred to
in more detail under the Argument in Point Ill of this
brief.
After receiving the $48 premium on August 18, 1969,
Agent Starbuck sent the same to State Farm's Greeley,
Colorado office which then serviced all State Farm policy·
holders in Utah, Arizona and several other Western
States (Affidavit of Starbuck, para. 8). Thereafter, State
Farm issued to Mrs. Wickes a new policy effective on the
date Agent Starbuck had received the premium (Affidavit
of A. F. Smith, para. 4). As requested by Mrs. Wickes,
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the new policy contained all the coverage afforded by the
old policy including "S Coverage," and it was issued to
her at her new address in Glendale, Arizona. The new
policy period was August 18, 1969 to the next regular
expiration date, February 1, 1970. Since premiums on
automobile insurance policies in Arizona were slightly
higher than in Utah, there was no refund on the $48 even
though the policy was out of force for 17 days during the
six-month policy period (Affidavit of A. F. Smith, para. 4).

In the usual case of this kind, the insured is contending that the agents or representatives of the insurance
company said or did something during the period while
there was still an opportunity to pay the premium and
keep continuous coverage that induced or caused the insured not to pay and which serves as an excuse for late
payment. There are no facts to support that kind of a
claim in this case. In fact, the only contact between plaintiff or her family and State Farm's representatives prior
to August 10, 1969, (which is the expiration date of the
policy in question, plus ten days) and upon which such
a claim might be predicated, is completely unfavorable to
the plaintiff's position. This is the telephone conversation between Agent Starbuck and James R. Wickes that
both acknowledge took place on Monday, August 4, 1969.
When one reads the Affidavit of Starbuck and the testimony of James R. Wickes in his deposition, it will be seen
that there is very little in dispute as between these two
as to what was said about payment of the premium and
the "S Coverage." James Wickes admitted that after he
telephoned Starbuck on Monday, August 4th, and told
5

the latter of his father's death in an accident the preceding
Saturday (Starbuck did not know of the accident before
the call) that Starbuck brought up the subject of "S Cov.
erage" and the death indemnity and told James Wickes
that there was an amount that then could be paid to his
mother by reason of the death of his father (James R.
Wickes' deposition, pages 9 and 10). James Wickes said
he wasn't sure whether Starbuck mentioned a figure of
$10,000 or $5,000 as constituting the amount of the indemnity. It is true that James Wickes did not flatly admit
that in this conversation Starbuck warned him that the
premium was then overdue and had to be paid within
ten days from August 1st or the coverage would be lost
and the indemnity not paid. This, among other things, is
what Starbuck swears he told James Wickes during this
conversation (Affidavit of Starbuck, para. 6). However,
James Wickes did admit that Starbuck could have told
him this during the conversation (James R. Wickes' depo·
sition, page 12), and he further admitted that if this is
what Starbuck states was said in this conversation, that he
"wouldn't be able to agree or disagree" with such a claim
(James R. Wickes' deposition, page 13 and see also his
deposition at pages 19 and 30). Certainly there is no
claim by James Wickes, the plaintiff, or anyone else that
Starbuck mislead them in to believing that the Wickes
had more than ten days from August 1st to pay the
premium.

6

In support of her claim that she didn't have to pay
the premium by August 10, 1969, and could still have continuous coverage, plaintiff relies upon claimed representations made to her by a State Farm sales agent in Arizona named Osborne. More will be said about this claim
under Point III. of this brief. However, it should be kept
in mind that Mrs. Wickes contacted Osborne for the first
time on September 3, 1969, after she had received a State
Farm notice the day before that raised a question in her
mind as to whether her $48 check mailed on August 16th
had been received and whether she then had coverage in
Arizona on the 1962 Olds. She had then telephoned her
son James, and he had directed her to get in contact with a
State Farm agent in Arizona (Betty Wickes' deposition,
page 14). She had selected Osborne by looking in the telephone directory and finding he was the closest agent to
her home (Betty Wickes' deposition, page 17). Prior to
this call being made upon him, Osborne had never seen
nor talked to any of the Wickes, and he knew absolutely
nothing about events involving the Wickes and State
Farm prior thereto. After talking to Osborne and to be
absolutely sure of having coverage, another $48 check was
sent to State Farm. However, this check was returned uncashed to Mrs. Wickes since State Farm had already placed
coverage upon its receipt of the earlier check.

All of the facts indicate that in the heartache and
confusion that followed the death of Homer W. Wickes,
an unfortunate mistake was made and that neither Mrs.
Wickes nor James R. Wickes paid prior to August 10th
the premium that James Wickes had been told by Agent
7

Starbuck should be paid. The check was finally written
out by Mrs. Wickes on August 13, 1969, and was appar.
ently given by her to James Wickes on that date in Salt
Lake City to be mailed. Although it is of little significance
because late even then, it was not mailed until three days
later and on August 16th from Phoenix. James Wickes
admitted that what probably occurred was that he forgot
to mail it in Salt Lake City and then did not mail it until
after the family had arrived in Arizona (James Wickes'
deposition, page 25).
Some time later the plaintiff did make demand upon
the defendant for the $10,000. The defendant investigat·
ed and then denied liability on the grounds that the policy
and coverage had expired on August 1, 1969, and since its
offer to reinstate the policy within ten days from that date
with no out of force period had not been accepted, that
there could be no coverage for the death which occurred
on August 2, 1969.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
"S COVERAGE" IS VEHICLE INSURANCE, NOT
LIFE INSURANCE, AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
STATUTORY 30-DAY GRACE PERIOD REQUIRE·
MENT FOR LIFE INSURANCE.
Plaintiff's position under Point I. of her brief that
we are dealing here with life insurance rather than ve·
hide insurance and that therefore the 30-day grace period
for life insurance must apply, is somewhat difficult to
understand. This is so because of a provision of the Utah
statutes found in the Insurance Code that deals expressly
8

with the very type of insurance involved in the "S Coverage" of the State Farm policy in question. This section of
the statute reads as follows:
31-11-6 'Vehicle Insurance' Defined - ( 1) Vehicle
insurance is insurance against loss or damage to
any land vehicle or aircraft or to property while
contained therein or thereon, or being loaded or
unloaded therein or therefrom, and against any
loss or liability resulting from or incident to ownership, maintenance, or use of any such vehicle or
aircraft.
(2) Insurance against accidental death or accidental
injury to persons while in, entering, alighting from,
adjusting, repairing, cranking, or caused by being
struck by a vehicle, or aircraft, when such insurance is issued as part of insurance on the vehicle,
or aircraft, shall be deemed to be vehicle insurance.
(Emphasis added).
Plaintiff's brief, without quoting it, refers to the
above section of the statute and attempts to downgrade its
significance by stating that it is found in those statutes
in the Insurance Code "relating to the amount of capital
funds that insurance companies are to have prior to being
allowed to transact business within the State of Utah,"
and that this chapter is "primarily concerned with what
types of insurance companies are required to have what
amounts of capital funds." In fact, this chapter of the
Insurance Code is entitled "CAPITAL FUNDS REQUIRED AND KINDS OF INSURANCE," and it is clear from
reading all sections of the statutes contained therein that
not only does it set forth the requirements for capital
funds but that it also defines a number of different kinds
of insurance. It is the only place in the Insurance Code
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30 days as far as "S Coverage" was concerned. Consider
also the record keeping and notification difficulties that
would be created. Instead of the insurer being able to
send out expiration notices gi>ing a single uniform expiration date for all coverages, a different type notice
would be required for those policies ha>ing .. S Co>erage"
so that the notice could differentiate between the normal
expiration date for the other co•erages and the additional
30-day grace period which applied to the .. S Co•erage."
If this court were to hold that the .. S Co>erage" invoh-ed here is life insurance and not •ehicle insurance.
then this would involve not only the 30-day grace period
provisions of 31-22-2, but it might in>olYe other provisions of Chapter 22 of the Insurance Code • 31-22-1 er.
sc-q. CC.A .. 1953 1. This is so because 31-22-1 requires
thJ.t 2.ll life- insurance policies issued in l:tah contain certain of the requirements set forth in Chapter 22. Included
J.mong these sections of this chapter are requiremenrs for
life insurance policies relating t0 inconresnbiliry. •3122-31 dividends. 131-22-61 policy loan. 1 31-22--· reinstatement. '"- 1-22-9 1 and se•eral other seccions.. Some O£
all of thc-se provisions might be construed by a court ro
3.pply ro such a coverage as .. S Co•erage·· ii it voere t::reare<l
as life insurance rather than •ehicle insura.oce. It is ~
parent that the Legislature has determined dut the regulation c,i life insurance policies and whicle in.sa.r.1.oce pol:c:es. including those ·with a coverage soch JS ··5 C.O.cr.ige ·. ::.re ro be rreJ.ted differently and gov~ ~ .~irrc=
t'.l' rc-quirements. It is also apparent dut in on..~ ro iwi.i
the- problc-ms that have been referred ro ilx-•e. ~ ~~
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ably a number of other problems, that the Legislature,
in its judgment, enacted 31-11-6 (2) U.C.A., 1953, in.
eluding the provision specifically stating that such coverage would be deemed to be vehicle insurance.
POINT

II.

LOSSES WHICH OCCURRED WITHIN TEN
DAYS AFTER THE EXPIRATION DATE ARE NOT
COVERED UNLESS THE PREMIUM WAS RECEIVED
WITHIN THAT TIME.
Plaintiff by Point II. of her brief is attempting to re·
write the vehicle insurance contract that existed between
herself, her late husband and State Farm by claiming, in
effect, that the policy period was not six months but rath·
er six months and ten days.
As it relates to the policy period, the State Farm pol·
icy in question provides as follows:
The policy period shall be as shown under 'Poli~
Period' and for such succeeding periods of s11
months each thereafter as the required renewal
premium is paid by the insured on or before the
expiration of the current policy period. The 'Pol·
icy Period' shall begin and end at 12:01. A.M.,
standard time at the address of the named msured
as stated herein. The premium shown is for the
policy period and coverages indicated on page 1.
(The foregoing is para. 1 of the Declarations on
page 10 of the policy.)
Policy Period Territory. This insurance applies to
accidents du;ing the policy period which occur
anywhere.
12

(The foregoing is para. 17 of the policy Conditions relating to Insuring Agreement IV., [i.e. "S
Coverage"} found on page 8 of the policy. Another provision of Insuring Agreement IV. provides
the Death Indemnity would be paid if the death
occurs within 30 days from the date of the accident.)
POLICY CONDITIONS - APPLICABLE TO
ALL COVERAGES UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED
* * * * *
( 1) to continue such coverage in force until the
expiration of the current policy, and
(2) to renew this policy for the succeeding policy
period, **** Such renewal shall be at the rates
legally in effect at the time thereof.
These agreements shall be void and of no effect:
(a) If the premium for the policy is not paid when
due;****
(The foregoing is found on pages 8 and 9 of the
policy.)
It is unquestioned that the policy period in question
expired on August 1, 1969 (Affidavit of A. F. Smith,
para. 2). There is nothing whatever in the policy that
would indicate that there could be continuous coverage
thereafter if the renewal premium were not paid by the
expiration date. That is, no provision of the policy gives
the policyholder the contractual right to keep continuous
coverage by paying the premium within ten days after
the expiration date. It is to be noted that the semi-annual
premium notice (Affidavit of A. F. Smith and Exhibit 1
attached thereto) which is mailed to the policyholder 30

13

days prior to the due or expiration date, makes no mention of any ten-day period and advises the policyholder
only that "payment by due date continues this policy in
force for six months."
The only notification a State Farm policyholder receives that he may pay within ten days after expiration
and keep continuous coverage is given him in an expiration notice (Affidavit of A. F. Smith and Exhibit 2 attached thereto) which is referred to in plaintiff's brief and
hereafter for simplicity sake as a "10-40 notice" and which
is mailed three days after the expiration date and if the
premium has not been received. This notice advises the
policyholder as follows:
To have continuous protection, make payment to
the Company or a State Farm agent within 10
days after policy due date. If payment is not made
within 10 days after due date, but is made in less
than 40 days, protection will be reinstated as of
date payment is received by the Company, subject
to established Company procedures.
Plaintiff calls this ten-day period a "grace period"
and contends that if the loss occurs during it, there is cov·
erage regardless of premium payment also being made
during the ten days. She further contends that even if the
premium is never paid, there is still coverage and the
premium is to be deducted from what is owed on the loss.
Since State Farm's policy, which is its only contract with
its insured, never even mentions any ten-day period and
since no Utah statute requires any such period in a ve·
hide insurance policy, it is difficult to understand how
this can be called a "grace period" as plaintiff claims the
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authorities define that term. Rather, it is apparent from
elementary principles of contract law (Reinstatement of
the Law of Contracts, section 24) that what is involved is
an offer by State Farm to its insured which may be accepted by the insured according to its terms but if not accepted
has no legal significance.
Defendant has been able to find two cases which are
closely in point to the instant case including the issue involved in Point II. of this brief. These are: McClure v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 148 S.E.2d
475 (Georgia 1966) and State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Robison, 461 P.2d 520 (Ariz. 1970).
Plaintiff's counsel cites these cases in his brief but dismisses them as "poorly reasoned." It is submitted that
they are well reasoned and that they place an interpretation on the ten-day period that is the only logical one that
can be given it.
In the McClure v. State Farm case Mrs. McClure's
policy included a coverage for a $5,000 accidental death
indemnity and her son James was an insured under this
coverage. The policy expired on July 18, 1963. James
was killed on July 26, 1963, and it appeared that the renewal premium was not paid by Mrs. McClure until
August 2, 1963. She sued State Farm for the $5,000 and
the trial court granted a Summary Judgment for State
Farm which the appellate court affirmed. The court in
the McClure case indicates that she had received a notice
from State Farm similar to the "10-40 notice" in this
case. The argument was made there as it is being made
by plaintiff here that the overall effect was to make this
15

ten days into a "grace period" and that there was coverage during that period even though the premium payment was made later. Concerning this contention, the
court stated as follows at 148 S.E.2d page 477:
We think this position is untenable. There is no
provision for a 'grace' period in the policy. The
policy of the company to provide continuous protection if the premium was paid within 10 days
after the expiration date of the policy constituted
an offer by the insurance company to the insured
which required acceptance of the insured by the
actual payment of the premium, or part thereof,
possibly, in order to constitute a contract. There is
no showing in this case whatsoever that the premium was paid or tendered to the insurance company within the 10 day period in which continuous
protection could be procured. Neither is there
any fraud alleged against the insurance company,
nor any other fact, which in law could be said to
have deterred the plaintiff from paying the premium within the said 10 day period. The rule
which applies to an event's occurring within a
'grace' period provided in an insurance policy does
not apply in such a case as this where there is no
binding contract on the part of the insurance com·
pany to pay a loss occurring within the 'grace' per·
iod. The situation in this case is that the insurance
company offered the insured the opportunity to
buy and pay for protection during the 1.0 day pe~·
iod by the actual payment of the premmm. This
offer the insured did not accept and it follows that
the insurance company was not obligated to pay
the loss under count 1.
In the State Farm v. Robison case, the insured, Mrs.
Robison, had a State Farm automobile policy which ex·
pired on May 18, 1964. On May 22, 1964, Mrs. Robison
16

was involved in an automobile accident which involved
certain coverages of the policy. Mrs. Robison knew that
she had ten days following May 18th or until midnight on
May 27th within which to pay the premium and keep continuous coverage. However, for various reasons detailed
in the opinion, Mrs. Robison did not end up tendering
the check to State Farm until June 15, 1964. Primarily
based on facts which it believed gave rise to an estoppel as
against State Farm, the trial court found coverage but the
appellate court reversed and held there was none. As in
the McClure case and in the instant case, Mrs. Robison's
attorney contended that the ten-day period was a "grace
period." On this subject matter, the Court stated as follows at 461 P.2d pages 523 and 524:
Initially, we consider it necessary to clarify the
legal effect of the following provision in the expiration notice sent to the insured:
'Payment within 10 days after due date
will reinstate your policy as of the policy due date.'
It is not disputed that it was the policy of the company to provide continuous protection if the premium was paid within this 10 day period. * * * *
No grace period exists unless there is either a
statutory provision or a provision in the contract
of insurance. Sahlin v. American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania, 103 Ariz. 57,
436 P.2d 606 (1968). Here, the policy did not provide for a grace period and the Arizona statutes
require none. Mrs. Robison's loss, therefore, cannot be construed as one occurring during a 'grace'
period.

17

Under Point II. of her brief, plaintiff cites a number
of authorities which she claims support her position. A
reading of these authorities will show that none of them
is specifically in point to the instant case. The issue before the Court here is whether the insurer is liable where
the loss occurs during a period following the expiration
date and during which payment may be made to provide
continuous coverage, but where the payment is made or
tendered after this period. These are the facts involved
in the instant case and which were involved in both the
McClure and Robison cases. Defendant has found no
other cases involving that specific fact situation and it is
not the one involved in any of the authorities cited by
the plaintiff.
Defendant will hereafter consider plaintiff's authorities cited in her brief and will point out wherein they are
distinguishable from this case.
The definition of "grace period" which is quoted
from Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition by plaintiff
gives her no help since if applied here, would exclude
coverage because the premium was not paid during the
ten-day period. Tucker v. New York Life Insurance Co.,
155 P.2d 173, involved the interpretation of a life insurance policy and whether the death resulted from injury
or disease. No question of late payment of premium or
grace period is involved in it. Perhaps it was cited only
for the generality quoted from it on page 13 of plaintiff's
brief which favors liberal construction of insurance policies in favor of the insured. Even on this remote basis,
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it is difficult to fathom what the provisions of the policy
in question are here and for which plaintiff seeks such a
liberal construction.

Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Sections 7960
and 7961, is cited for the general rule "that if the insured
dies during the grace period, his death is covered." One
problem with this being pertinent to the instant case is
that Appleman is talking about life insurance and policies
in which there unquestionably was a grace period. No
cases are cited by Appleman in those sections which would
support the proposition urged here by the plaintiff and
which would lend weight to the argument that ten days
should be added to this policy of vehicle insurance as a
grace period. Moreover, a reading of the cases cited by
Appleman in support of the proposition quoted by the
plaintiff in her brief demonstrates that most involve a fact
situation where not only the loss occurred in the grace
period but where the premium was also paid or tendered
during that period.
Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama v. Colquitt, 168
So. 2d 251, cited by plaintiff on page 13 of her brief, involved a loss occurring on February 20th after the February 15th expiration date of the policy and where the
court ordered the amount of the loss paid less the premium
which had not been paid. However, the critical distinction
between that case and the instant one is that the policy
itself expressly granted the insured "a grace period of ten
( 10) days."
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Meadows v. Continental Assurance Co., 89 F.2d 256,
cited by plaintiff on page 14 of her brief is claimed by
plaintiff to have "held that where the death of the insured occurred during the grace period, the policy must
be paid, less the amount of any premiums owing to the
company by the insured." This was neither holding nor
dicta in that case and, in fact, the insurance company and
not the beneficiary of the insured was the prevailing party
there both in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals.
The life insurance policy involved in the Meadows case
did have an express provision in it which provided essentially as has been quoted from the plaintiff's brief, but the
issue decided by the court there related to an interpretation of the word "default" in the policy and is totally unrelated to what is involved here.
Pickens v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 144 S.E.2d 68 (So. Carolina 1965) is cited by plaintiff on page 13 of her brief, and it is claimed to represent
the "weight of authority, and the better reasoned view,"
presumably in support of plaintiff's contention that the
ten-day period is a "grace period." Although the Pickens
case is at least somewhat similar factually to the instant
case, it is of no help whatever to plaintiff's contention
under Point II. of her brief and actually is more supportive of defendant's position than plaintiff's.
In the Pickens case, a death indemnity was involved
under a vehicle policy and the death of the insured occurred after the expiration of the policy but within ten
days. There, as here, State Farm had sent the insured an
expiration notice within a day or two after the expiration
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date advising that continuous protection could be had if
the premium was paid within ten days. The crucial distinction between that case and the instant one is that the
court held in Pickens that there was a jury issue as to
whether a tender of the premium to State Farm had been
made by the brother of the deceased within the ten days.
Obviously, we would have quite a different case here if
the Wickes were claiming that they had paid or tendered
the premium within the ten days. In the Pickens case,
State Farm contended that since the ten-day provision was
not in the policy and was merely an offer which had to be
accepted by the deceased during his lifetime, that there
was no acceptance of the offer and no obligation to pay
even assuming the tender by the brother of the premium
within the ten days. State Farm makes no such contention
here and the facts are completely distinguishable. In the
Pickens case and concerning this ten-day period which
expired on March 12th, the court stated the following at
144 S.E. 2d page 71:
Contrary to the contention of the appellant that
the expiration notice was merely an offer to renew,
which required the acceptance of Pickens during
this lifetime, we think the language of the notice
is indicative of an intention on the part of the appellant to give Pickens through March 12 to pay
the premium, and to afford him continuous protection in the meantime, provided the premium he
paid within the time allowed. (Emphasis added).
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POINT

III.

NO WAIVER OF TIMELY PAYMENT OF THE
PREMIUM OCCURRED BY ACCEPTANCE OF IT
AFTER NOTICE OF THE LOSS SINCE NO PART OF
THE PREMIUM PAID WAS EVER APPLIED TO THE
PERIOD OF THE LOSS AND IT WAS ONLY APPLIED
FOR FUTURE COVERAGE FROM THE DATE RECEIVED.
Plaintiff argues in Point III. of her brief that the "1040 notice" is immaterial and its terms irrelevant to the
disposition of this case. She goes on to contend that defendant's reliance on the "10-40 notice" is misplaced because this is an attempt by defendant to vary the terms
of the policy in a way not permitted by statutes or the
policy. Finally, plaintiff concludes from this that since
we are to act as if this notice never existed or was sent,
that the action of State Farm in accepting the premium on
August 18, 1969, constitutes a waiver of the policy terms
requiring prompt payment. By this reasoning, which
plaintiff states is an alternative to her theory in Point II.
that the "10-40 notice" created a "grace period", plaintiff concludes that there was coverage on August 2, 1969
when Homer W. Wickes was killed.
Plaintiff gains nothing whatever in claiming coverage for August 2nd if we disregard entirely the "10-40
notice." This is so because there is absolutely nothing that
State Farm or its representatives are claimed to have said
or done up to the time the premium was received on August 18th that could possibly be said to have led Mrs.
Wickes to believe that the defendant's acceptance of the
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premmm on that date was a waiver of the policy prov1s10ns requiring prompt payment or no coverage. An
eminent authority has defined "waiver" as follows:
****Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of
a known right; it is the expression of an intention
not to insist upon what the law affords. It is consensual in its nature; the intention may be inferred from conduct, and the knowledge may be
actual or constructive, but both knowledge and intent are essential elements. Prosser, The Making of
a Contract of Insurance in Minnesota, 17 Minn.
L. Rev. 567, 594.
When one examines all of the facts in this record it
can be seen that plaintiff's argument on "waiver" and for
continuous coverage from August 2nd forward cannot
possibly be sustained. Let us examine the facts and see if
State Farm's acceptance of this premium constituted an
"intentional relinquishment" of its right to be paid
promptly or an indication of that Company's "intention
not to insist on what the law affords."
It would be of some assistance to plaintiff on her
waiver theory if State Farm had on one or more occasions
prior to August 18, 1969 accepted a late premium after
the ten days from the expiration date and still granted
continuous coverage. However, no such instance has been
cited by plaintiff as having occurred during the approximately four years of coverage which the family had with
State Farm prior to August 1, 1969. To the contrary, the
record indicates that in all instances before that date when
the Wickes did pay their premium more than ten days
after the expiration date, that they were never given continuous coverage but that there was an out of force period.
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Agent Starbuck recalled that this had occurred on two
occasions prior to August 1, 1969. (Affidavit of James G.
Starbuck, para. 3). Also, it is significant that the last
premium that was paid by the Wickes before August 1,
1969, was paid late on February 18, 1969 (rather than
February 1, 1969, the expiration date of that policy) and
at that time the policy was only reinstated on the date payment was received and to run to the end of the regular
six-month period which ended August 1, 1969. Since the
policy was out of force from February 2nd through February 17, 1969, an amount of $4.20 representing the ~re
mium for the out of force period was refunded to the
Wickes at that time (Affidavit of A. F. Smith, para. 3).
Thus, not only are the Wickes unable to factually support
a claim that their prior experience with State Farm could
have led them to expect continuous coverage when the
premium was paid on August 18, 1969, but the very re·
verse is true. Their most recent experience in paying a
premium should have caused them to expect that State
Farm would handle the August premium and coverage
just as it had the preceding February and this is exactly
the way they were handled.
The Wickes make no claim that anything occurred
during the ten days following the August 1, expiration
date that could be used by plaintiff as a basis for her claim
of waiver. To the contrary again, and as pointed out in
the Statement of Facts portion of this brief, the only contact with State Farm during that period is unfavorable
to plaintiff's position. This was James Wickes' telephone
conversation with Agent Starbuck. The latter's testimony
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in his affidavit is that he told James Wickes the premium
payment was then overdue and had to be paid within ten
days from August 1st or the death benefit would be lost
(Affidavit of James G. Starbuck, para. 6). James Wickes
neither admitted nor denied that he was told this and said
he simply couldn't remember (James R. Wickes' deposition, pages 13, 19 and 20). James Wickes did admit
that within a day or two after his returning to Salt Lake
City on August 3, 1969, that he found at the church among
his father's papers the "semiannual premium notice"
which is Exhibit I to A. F. Smith's Affidavit and marked.
Exhibit I and 2 to the deposition of James R. Wickes
(James R. Wickes' deposition, pages 17 and 18). This
notice advised that the premium had to be paid by August
1, 1969. James Wickes admitted that during the ten days
following August 1, 1969 that he became aware that the
premium on the 1962 Olds was then overdue and that he
knew this either from his telephone conversation with
Starbuck or from the premium notice (James R. Wickes'
deposition, page 22). During this period, James Wickes
did have a notion that there was some period of time after
the expiration date during which the premium could be
paid and still have continuous coverage. However, he
didn't know just how long this was although he admitted
Starbuck could have told him it was ten days (James R.
Wickes' deposition, page 19). In any event, he made no
claim that Starbuck told him it could be paid later than
10 days or certainly 18 days after the expiration date.
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If Agent Starbuck is believed, then there cannot possibly be a waiver since he advised plaintiff's representative, James Wickes, that the premium had to be paid
within the ten days or no coverage. This would have
been the very opposite of State Farm's waiving prompt
payment which the plaintiff now claims it did. Even if
Starbuck' s testimony is not believed or disregarded, there
is still no basis for waiver since James Wickes admits he
knew the premium was then overdue and neither Starbuck
nor anyone else with State Farm led him to believe that if
they waited to August 18th to pay the premium, that there
would be continuous coverage.
The next contact that Starbuck or anyone else from
State Farm had with the Wickes after this August 4th
telephone conversation was Starbuck's receipt in the mail
on August 18th of James Wickes' letter dated August 13th
mailed from Phoenix on August 16th and enclosing his
mother's check. Plaintiff argues that by accepting this
check, State Farm somehow waived its right to have Mrs.
Wickes bound by the terms of the policy that expired
August 1st or else waived its right to allow continuous
coverage but only if the premium was paid within ten
days after the expiration date. One of the difficulties of
this waiver argument of plaintif's is that it is premised
on an incorrect factual assumption by which plaintiff
would have us believe that she paid her $48 premium to
State Farm on August 18th to be accepted only on the
basis that she be granted continuous coverage retroactive
to August 2nd. This is simply not the fact, and it is clear
both from plaintiff's testimony and also from that of her
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son, James R. Wickes, that what they wanted when they
paid the $48 premium was to have vehicle insurance on
the 1962 Olds for the future. Nothing was mentioned in
James Wickes' letter accompanying his mother's check or
otherwise which conditioned the premium's being paid
on State Farm's granting retroactive coverage to August
2nd as well as future coverage. This letter advised Starbuck that the $48 check was enclosed for his mother's
insurance on the '62 Olds and that the insurance should be
issued in her name alone deleting his father's name (Affidavit of James G. Starbuck, and Exhibit "A" attached
thereto). Moreover, the conversation of August 4th between Starbuck and James Wickes and also the manner in
which the February 1969 renewal premium was handled
could not reasonably have suggested to Starbuck that the
premium was being tendered on that basis. To the contrary, it undoubtedly suggested to him that what Mrs.
Wickes wanted was immediate coverage for the future on
this '62 Olds she was driving to Arizona. The record is
full of statements by James Wickes and particularly Mrs.
Wickes that this is exactly what she did want and that she
would have been upset had there been any delay on Starbuck or State Farm's part in placing immediate coverage.
James Wickes testified that at the time he mailed the
premium that his mother was driving the Olds down there
and needed all the coverages. He further testified that
he was most concerned about getting the premium paid
because he "wouldn't want the vehicle to be driven without any insurance coverage" (James R. Wickes' deposition, pages 27 and 31).
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Mrs. Wickes was even more emphatic in her testimony about her concern at this time in August, 1969 for
future coverage. Mrs. Wickes said she wanted the "S
Coverage" for $10,000 on her life so she "was covered in
case anything happened to me for the children." (Betty
Wickes' deposition, page 15). She also said she wanted
public liability, collision and uninsured motorist coverage
because she knew "it is not good to drive a car without
being covered" (Betty Wickes' deposition, page 15). She
was asked if her concern in paying the $48 premium was
about "the 'S Coverage' that had been on there" (i.e. the
coverage for the prior period which is involved in this
litigation) and her answer was to repeat "I was concerned about driving a car that was not covered" (Betty
Wickes' deposition, pages 15 and 16). She testified she
had told Agent Osborne on September 3rd, "Now, I don't
want to take a chance, if I would be in an accident, that I
would not be covered" (Betty Wickes' deposition, page
14). Finally, she admitted in her deposition that she had
wanted coverage in the future even though she was not
also given retroactive coverage to August 2nd, because "I
did not want to be uncovered at any time" (Betty Wickes'
deposition, page 22).
It is a little difficult to understand how State Farm
can be said to have waived anything by accepting her
money and giving her the very thing she wanted. This is
so even though State Farm, through its Sales Agent James
G. Starbuck, did know of the loss and Homer W. Wickes'
death at the time he accepted the premium and sent it on
to Greeley. However, this i:,Jio legal significance because
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the premium was never applied or used for the period of
the loss but was only applied for the future coverage she
wanted. If State Farm had at any time applied any part
of this $48 premium to a period before or at the time of
the loss, even though it may later have refunded or tried
to refund it, then we would be involved with a different
legal principle and one that is involved in some of the
cases plaintiff cites.
Plaintiff contends that State Farm should not have
accepted the $48 without first advising her or a member
of her family that it was accepting the $48 check at a
higher premium rate for a shorter period of time. Is it
reasonable to expect that State Farm should have delayed
in accepting the premium until it could have advised Mrs.
Wickes or her family of these matters and perhaps obtained a commitment from her that the premium was only
being accepted for future coverage and not any past coverage? It is impractical to have expected any insurance
company to have done this under these facts, and it would
only have delayed covering her which was the very thing
she didn't want. Suppose Starbuck and State Farm had
not immediately placed coverage and had delayed doing
so for a few days, or more, to advise the Wickes of these
matters or obtain this commitment and in the meantime
Mrs. Wickes had suffered some other loss relating to this
1962 Olds. Obviously, if such had occurred, State Farm
would have been responsible and would have had no excuse for not immediately accepting the premium and placing coverage.
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Plaintiff apparently finds some significance on this
waiver argument in defendant's having kept the entire
$48 without refund while still excluding 17 days from the
six months renewal period. The uncontradicted evidence
is that the premium rates were higher in Arizona where
Mrs. Wickes elected to move and that based on those
rates, she was not entitled to a refund (Affidavit of A.
F. Smith, para. 4). Mrs. Wickes herself acknowledged that
she knew the Arizona rates were higher than Utah's (Betty
Wickes' deposition, page 19). No claim is made that the
Arizona rates were unfair or that they were not the same
charged everyone else in Arizona who fit in the same
underwriting category. The amount of these premiums is
regulated by law and by the insurance commissioners of
the various states. It is simply an emotional argument to
attempt to fault State Farm here for immediately placing
coverage by accepting the premium and to contend that
State Farm should have delayed placing coverage until it
first advised Mrs. Wickes about the higher rates in Arizona.
Plaintiff in her brief also claims a waiver by reason
of Agent Osborne's claimed statement to her in Arizona
on September 3, 1969, when he is supposed to have told
her that if she sent in the check at that time (this check
was returned to her uncashed) that the coverage would be
retroactive to August 2nd. The facts concerning Mrs.
Wickes' chance meeting with Agent Osborne have been
detailed above under Statement of Facts and won't be
repeated here. However, it is perfectly obvious for several reasons that this claimed representation made over
one month after the policy had expired by a complete
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stranger to whatever had occurred in Utah, cannot constitute a waiver of State Farm's right to assert there was
no coverage on August 2nd. If this kind of a representation can serve as a basis for waiver, then all an insured
needs to do after his policy has expired and he has suffered a loss is to find some agent who will tell him he still
has coverage or even if such an agent can't be found, the
insured can assert this and raise a jury question. Presumably, plaintiff would claim such a gratuitous statement
can constitute a waiver if made a month, six months or a
year after the expiration date. The law is clear that what
Osborne is claimed to have said cannot serve as a waiver
against State Farm. The insurance contract cannot be
modified by an agent in this manner. See Sections 31-1918, 31-19-20 and 31-19-26, U.C.A., 1953, and also Barnett
v. State Automobile and Casualty Underwriters, 487 P.2d
311 (Utah 1971). The policy itself also provides that its
terms may not be waived or changed except by a duly
authorized policy endorsement (See para. 5 on page 8 of
the policy).
In her brief plaintiff cites a number of authorities
which support the principle that an insurance company
may waive a provision in its policy requiring payment of
premium by a given date with the penalty for non-payment being expiration, lapse or forfeiture of the policy.
Defendant has no quarrel that this can occur and under
appropriate facts. The difficulty with the plaintiff's authorities is that they are all clearly distinguishable on the
facts from the instant case. Hereafter, defendant will
refer to the authorities cited by the plaintiff and, as briefly
as possible, point out wherein they are distinguishable.
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Plaintiff relies upon Loftis v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company of California, 114 P. 134 (Utah 1911).
In this case as in most of those cited under Point III. by
plaintiff, the loss has occurred and the insurance company
thereafter accepts a premium covering the period which
includes the loss and under circumstances where there is
no need or desire for future coverage. In other words, the
insurer on one hand has collected a premium for a period
which includes the loss and on the other hand is trying to
deny coverage for that period. Thus, in the Loftis case life
insurance premiums were to be paid monthly by being
deducted from the insured's wages and if not paid promptly, the insurance would lapse. The insured did not make
sufficient wages in August and September to pay the
premium and he was killed on October 14th. However,
his October wages for the time prior to his death were
sufficient to pay all three months and an amount to cover
this was deducted from his wages and paid to the insurance company after his death and with knowledge of it.
These premiums were later refunded.
The major distinction between the Loftis case and
the instant case is clear. In Loftis, the insurance company
accepted premiums for the period prior to and at the time
of the loss under a policy that otherwise would have lapsed for nonpayment of these same premiums. In the instant case, State Farm never at any time applied or charged any of the $48 premium to any period before August
18th or which included the date of the August 2nd loss.
From the beginning, State Farm took the premium and
applied it only to future coverage. This case would be
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apposite to the Loftis case and many of those cited in
plaintiff's brief if State Farm had, after the acceptance of
the $48 premium applied some of it to the period before
it was received including the date of the loss. Also, even
if State Farm had applied all of the premium as it did to
future coverage and if this coverage had been unneeded
or unwanted (as e.g. if the insured vehicle was destroyed,
the insured was dead or another reason eliminating a need
for future coverage) then an argument might be made that
State Farm was inconsistently charging for coverage it
deni~d existed. This is the pattern that runs through most
of these cases cited by plaintiff on this point, and it is completely lacking in the instant case.
Plaintiff cites as authorities Long, The Law of Liability Insurance, Sections 17-42, and 43 Am. Jur. 2d Section
1129. Here again, Long talks about "acceptance of unearned premiums," and the quote from Am. Jur. talks
about retention of premiums "covering the period of default." These may be accurate statements of the law but
they do not fit the facts of this case because the defendant
accepted no unearned premium nor did it retain any premium covering the period of the default.
Plaintiff cites Seavey v. Erickson, 69 N.W.2d 889,
244 Minnesota 232, 52 A.L.R. 2d 1144 (1955). The facts
of these consolidated cases are somewhat complicated and
will not be detailed here but a careful reading of these
cases will show that the facts are radically different from
this case. Among other grounds, the waiver of the insurer
was predicated on the fact that the insurance company
accepted and retained a premium on a vehicle which it
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knew was totally destroyed. Also, and although there
was some question about this, it appeared that the insured
may actually have paid a premium for the period covered
by the loss. Moreover, there were other facts involving
the prior practice of the insurer in giving notice and collecting premiums and also concerning its investigation of
the accident to the insured vehicle and its obtaining of
statements from its insured that weighed heavily in the
court's decision and which are completely lacking in the
instant case. The Seavey case does have the distinction
of being the only one cited by plaintiff under Point III.
that involves vehicle insurance. All the others involve
other kinds of insurance and mostly life insurance.
Also relied upon by plaintiff is Sullivan v. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 64 P.2d 351 (Utah 1937).
Here again, this case is quite complicated factually but a
a careful reading of it will show that it is not closely in
point to the instant case. In the Sullivan case which involved a life insurance policy with Beneficial, Sullivan
had been insured for approximately 12 years but failed
to make the quarterly payment that was due on October
6, 1932, and he also failed to make it within the 31-day
grace period thereafter which was provided by the policy.
Thereafter, Beneficial sent notice to Sullivan indicating
that his interest in the policy had lapsed and was forfeited
but that he could reinstate it. Mrs. Sullivan also had conversations with various officials of Beneficial in which
she claimed that they told her that they would not insist
upon the grace period. On December 24, 1932, Beneficial
accepted from Mrs. Sullivan the quarterly premium that
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was due on October 6, 1932, and that would pay the policy
current to January 6, 1933. Later, Beneficial tendered
premium payment back to Mr. Sullivan and tried to claim
that it had been accepted initially on conditions which
were never conveyed to Mrs. Sullivan when it was accepted. The holding of the Sullivan case is that the facts, including those just mentioned, gave rise to a jury question
as to whether Beneficial had waived forfeiture of the policy after the insured's failure to make the October 6, 1932
quarterly premium payment or within the grace period
thereafter. The essential difference in Sullivan as in
Loftis from the instant case is that the insurer accepted a
premium for the same period during which in the lawsuit
it tried to claim there was no coverage and there had been
a forfeiture because of non-payment of premium. This is
simply not the fact in the instant case.
Plaintiff cites Ellerbeck v. Continental Casualty Co.,
227 P. 805 (Utah 1924). In this case a renewal certificate
for a policy of health and accident insurance was mailed to
plaintiff and the certificate indicated that the premium
was to be paid by October 8, 1922 and, if paid, that the
policy would continue in force for one year. The premium
was $120 per year. Bills for the premium were sent for
three months, but it was not paid. Thereafter and in December, 1922, a conversation was had between the insured and a representative of the insurance company in which
the former inquired if the insured wished to keep the policy or should it be cancelled and the insured advised not
to cancel it. On February 23, 1923 a partial payment of
$60 was paid and was retained. On February 24, 1923 the
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plaintiff went in to the hospital and it was conceded that
the condition causing the hospitalization had existed before February 24, 1923. The issue therefore became
whether there was coverage after October, 1922 and prior
to February 24th of 1923. In Ellerbeck, the court found
that there were sufficient facts by which the jury could
have found (as it had) that the insurer or its authorized
agents extended credit to the insured for the payment of
the premium and that the plaintiff within the period of
such credit accepted the extension of credit and paid the
amount of the premium. This readily distinguishes that
case from the instant one. Plaintiff in her brief attempts
to draw some parallel between State Farm Agent Osborne
in this case and the general agent or Continental Casualty
Company in the Ellerbeck case. In the instant case the
plaintiff had never dealt with Osborne until more than
one month after the expiration of the policy. In the
Ellerbeck case the insured had dealt with the general
agent for several years and the court's holding was that
this was the agent whom the jury could find had extended
the insured credit to pay the premium. Also, the waiver
by the agent in Ellerbeck was based on a course of dealing
between himself and the insured for a substantial period
prior to the loss.

Parker v. California State Life Insurance Co., 40 P.2d
175 (Utah 1935), also relied upon by plaintiff, is distinguishable from the instant case on the facts. In the
Parker case the life insurance policy did lapse for non·
payment of premium but the insurance company made an
express offer to waive the lapse if certain conditions were
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complied with by the insured, Parker. It is apparent from
reading the opinion that Parker did everything necessary
to comply with the waiver offered by the insurer and he
did this by filling out and sending to the insurer on November 5th a form of reinstatement the insurer had prepared together with a portion of the premium. Several
days later and after his letter with this form and the premium had been received by the insurer, Parker was killed
in an accident. The insurer learned of this and then attempted to deny coverage and return the premium, but it
is perfectly obvious from reading the facts of the case that
the insurance company had waived the lapse and would
have continued the policy in full force but for the completely fortuitous circumstances of the insured being killed after he had complied with the conditions imposed by
the insurer. The facts are somewhat similar to those in
Moore v. Prudential Insurance Co., No. 12388 (Utah 1971)
decided within the last few weeks by this court, but they
are certainly not analogous to those in the instant case.

Farrington v. Granite State Fire Insurance Co., 232
P.2d 754 (Utah 1951) is also cited by plaintiff. It is difficult to see any relevance factually between the Farrington case and the instant case or why it was cited. In the
Farrington case the insurance was granted, the premiums
were accepted, including a substantial portion after the
loss and for the period of the loss, and then after the building was destroyed by fire, the insurance company attempted to defend primarily on the basis of some claimed misrepresentations which the court said were not material.
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In American National Insurance Co. v. Cooper, 458
P.2d 257 (Colo. 1969) cited by plaintiff, the insurance
company sent the insured a letter requesting payment of
his then overdue premium and, in effect, waiving any default if he would pay the premium. A loss then occurred
in the form of injuries to the insured and the premium was
then tendered for the period covering the loss and was accepted by the insurance company. At no time was this
premium ever returned or offered to be returned to the
insured. It was also apparent from the letter sent to the
insured that the insurance company considered that the
policy was still in force if the insured paid the premiums
and that the insurer was not considering a reinstatement
where the policy would be out of force for a period of
time. This was reinforced when the insurer accepted and
kept the premiums including for the period of time covered by the loss. The court held that under these circumstances and primarily by accepting and keeping the pre·
miums with full knowledge of the loss, the insurer had
waived its rights under the policy.

Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters, Inc., 275 P.2d 675,
2 Utah 2d 3 73 (Utah 1954) is a case somewhat in point to
the instant case although the facts are substantially differ·
ent. It is cited although not relied upon by plaintiff. In
the Cooper case a medical policy was involved which ran
from month to month and which contained a 31-day grace
period. The principal issue resolved by the court in the
Cooper case was whether the loss occurred and the pre·
mium was paid within the grace period or after the grace
period. The situation was that the accident giving rise to
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the loss occurred in the afternoon of October 31st and
the premium was paid that evening. The court held that
the grace period had terminated at noon on the same date
and the policy had lapsed at that time and the effect of the
payment of the premium that evening was only to reinstate the policy at that time. Thus the policy was out of
force at the time the loss occurred. One contention made
by the plaintiff in the Cooper case was that the insurer
had waived its rights to demand payment in advance of
premiums by accepting premiums late at other times. The
court considered this argument and acknowledged that
an insurer "which, by any course of conduct, induces in
the mind of the insured an honest belief, reasonably
founded, that strict compliance with a stipulation for
prompt payment of premiums will not be insisted on,
waives the right to a forfeiture for non-payment." However, the court rejected the argument of Mrs. Cooper and
said that "there were no acts on the part of the [insurer}
which could be regarded as inconsistent with the contract
nor as inducing a belief that the [insurer} did not intend
to enforce the terms thereof."
Defendant has been unable to find any authorities
that are closely in point to the instant case and which support plaintiff's theory of waiver. There simply is no basis
for such an argument in this case where not even a claim
is made of any acts or conduct on the part of defendant,
State Farm, which occurred prior to August 10th and
which could support a waiver. After that date and on
August 18th, the premium was accepted and a new policy
was issued but this was the very thing plaintiff wanted.
39

CONCLUSION
POINT

I.

The death indemnity involved here, called "S Cov·
erage", is not life insurance but is vehicle insurance by
reason of the express provisions of a Utah statute (31·
11-6 U.C.A., 1953). As vehicle insurance, there is no
"grace period" required by law and since the policy of
insurance did not provide for one, none existed in the
present case.
POINT

II.

The policy expired on August 1, 1969, and the loss
occurred on August 2nd. By notice sent three days after
August 1st, the defendant offered plaintiff the right to
have continuous coverage, including on the date of loss,
if the premium was paid by August 10th. On August 4th,
plaintiff's son was orally advised of this offer by State
Farm's Agent Starbeck. No payment of premium was
made until August 18th or eight days after the offer had
expired. The ten days was not a "grace period" but mere·
ly a period during which the defendant made plaintiff an
offer which the plaintiff failed to accept.
POINT

III.

The policy expired on August 1, 1969, and prior to
the accident and loss which occurred on August 2nd.
Plaintif contends that State Farm or its representatives
did something that constituted a waiver of its right under
the policy to be paid the premium on time. The facts
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claimed by plaintiff fail to support any such theory of
waiver. As stated under Point II., State Farm did offer the
plaintiff the chance for continuous coverage if the premium was paid by August 10th. This was not done and the
premium was mailed August 16th and received August
18th. On the latter date, State Farm issued a new policy
to plaintiff and commenced immediately the coverage she
wanted. No premium was ever applied or charged to
August 2nd or anytime before the premium was received.
This is an unfortunate case but there is absolutely nothing
in this record to support a claim that State Farm waived
its rights or was responsible for the premium being paid
late.
The Summary Judgment granted by the lower court
of dismissal of plaintiff's complaint as against the defendant should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted
STRONG & HANNI

BY-----------------------------------------------DAVID K. WINDER
Attorneys for
Defendant and Respondent
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I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing brief to Allan L. Larson at 7th Floor Continental
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah on this ... s1L .. day
of December, 1971.

DAVID K. WINDER
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